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Abstract:  Powers of attorney are often interpreted as evidence of
trust among the parties involved, and as such, of the existence of
personal  links  between principals  and their  proxies. We build  a
novel  dataset  of  notarized  powers  of  attorney capturing  a  wide
variety of agency relationships in  four  large French commercial
cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to test hypotheses
on the  relational  basis  of  economic  relationships.  We find  little
support for the idea of an evolution from personal to anonymous
relationships  during  our  period.  Rather,  our  results  point  to  the
complementarity of embeddedness and formality, and suggest an
increase  over  time  in  the  importance  of  relationships  based  on
repeated interactions, and a broad homophily driving merchants to
choose fellow merchants as proxies.
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Looming large as a backdrop to descriptions of the transition to the modern period, the
tale  of  modernity  contrasts the  premodern  world’s  reliance  on  private-order,  personal-based
modes of interaction,  to which  less-developed societies are confined, with the  individualistic
framework of impersonal exchanges enabled by formal institutions and impartial courts.2 In a
different guise, this narrative has been quite pervasive in other disciplines, and the storyline itself
was  shared  by  many  contemporaries.  North  and  others  echo  Weber’s  account  of  the
developmental path of societies, in which modernization is characterized by a movement from
status  to  contract,  or,  more  precisely,  by  “the  replacement  of  a  fraternal  by  a  business
relationship, i.e., of a status contract by a purposive contract”.3 Contemporary actors had, in turn,
ambivalent feelings towards these transformations.  Adam Smith praised the move away from
noncommercial  societies,  in  which  personal  relationships  could  imply  dependence,  to  more
impersonal commercial societies, which he equated with freedom.4 Others feared, however, that
trust, and therefore credit, would collapse in the context of easily negotiable bills of exchange,
corporations with large numbers of shares, and professional agents paid to perform the duties of
a proxy, instead of friends representing friends. These trends were viewed as symptoms of a
change from a traditional to a money-driven, possibly faithless society – and heated debates took
place about the desirability of this change.5 
This  broad-brushed  narrative attributes  the  allegedly  inexorable  move  of  Western
societies — from the former ideal-type to the latter — to an accumulation of structural changes
that arguably culminated at the end of the eighteenth century with the French and the industrial
revolutions, both of which established important legal and economic foundations for impersonal
markets. Together, the French Revolution, which fashioned a new legal system (e.g., abolishing
2 Greif, Institutions; North, Economic change; Dixit, On modes.
3 Weber, Economy and society, p. 709.
4 Berry et al., eds., Adam Smith.
5 Kessler, Revolution, chapters 4 and 5 depict the growing anxiety due to the depersonalization of credit relations; 
on lawyers criticizing professional proxies see Xifaras, ‘Science sociale’.
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the guilds in 1791 and, with them, the old social order that rested on status and communities),
and  the  Napoleonic  codification  of  the  1800s  (improving  access  to  courts  and  guarantying
property rights with, for instance, the creation of an official registry) promoted more impersonal
market relationships.6 The granting of legal equality to all men of property is a cornerstone of the
narrative  about  the  rise  of  impersonal  societies,  in  which  contracts  replaced  personal
commitments.  Nowhere  during  this  period  were  the  changes  in  the  legal  underpinnings  of
markets as pronounced as in France. If the standard modernization narrative holds true, they
should be most observable in France over this period. At the same time, profound developments
in the organization of commerce accompanied the Industrial Revolution, fueling the emergence
of competitive and impersonal markets.7 In reaching new markets, merchants had to overcome,
in Braudel’s words, “distance, the first enemy”.8 Representation furnished a means to conduct
transactions at a distance and support the geographically expanding structure of commerce. In
addition, merchant houses grew in size, creating more hierarchical structures and sharpening the
need to delegate. More complex operation chains, in turn, required merchants to specialize and to
further delegate non-core activities. Similar to business associations, sea loans, insurance, and
bills of exchange, powers of attorney were part of the menu of contractual choices that offered
merchants a device to span space, scale, and scope. Studying from a micro perspective when and
how these contractual practices responded to this macro modernization allows us to revise the
macro narrative, especially with respect to the timing of a supposed transition. 
In this  paper,  we empirically test  whether  relationships  became more impersonal  and
formalized  in  France from the eighteenth to  the  nineteenth  centuries  by analyzing power of
attorney contracts that tied together principals and their proxies. In particular, we test whether
principal-proxy  relationships  became  less  embedded  in  families  or  communities,  and  more
impersonal and formal. To this effect, we use almost 900 notarized proxy forms, covering 4 large
French commercial cities at 3 different points in time — 1751, 1800, and 1851 — to build a
novel  dataset  containing  information  on  the  identities  of  principals  and  proxies,  their
6 See e.g., Rosenthal, ‘Development of irrigation’. Arruñada and Andonovo, ‘Common Law’.
7 For a discussion on the role of long-distance trade, see O’Rourke et al., ‘Trade and Empire’.
8 Braudel, The Mediterranean, title of Part 2, p. 355.
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relationships, and the terms of these delegation contracts. Because such contracts capture a wide
variety of agency relations (e.g.,  legal representation,  debt recovery,  inheritance proceedings,
management of business and assets), studying powers of attorney offers one way to test whether
relationships became more impersonal and formal over time across several markets. 
While we are interested in empirically testing the idea of a radical change from personal,
communitarian-based to formal, anonymous relationships in agency contracts (Hypothesis 0), we
have also devised more fine-grained hypotheses,  especially regarding the powers of attorney
given by merchants. Through Hypothesis 1 we test whether “personal” and “formal” foundations
of trust were used as complements, not substitutes, throughout our period; for example, as when
formal clauses were used to ensure the loyalty of agents after the matching has occurred on a
personal  basis.  Hypotheses  2  and  3  question  the  dichotomy between  personal  relationships
(generally  thought  of  as  embedded  in  a  family  or  ethnic  community)  and  anonymous
relationships  by  putting  forward  other  types  of  relationships  that  might  have  become  more
common during our period. Hypothesis 2 focuses on relationships that are created by repeated
economic  interactions  in  a  context  of  division  of  labor,  whereas  Hypothesis  3  suggests  that
signaling  that  one  is  part  of  the  merchant  community  could  in  itself  foster  preferential
relationships.
The extensive paper trail left in early modern and modern archives by powers of attorney
(mandats in  French)  testifies  to  their  importance.9 Those  proxy  forms  (procurations)  are
everywhere in the French notarial records and present in most Continental European and U.S.
archives.10 For the year of 1851, proxy forms represent 14 per cent of all Parisian notarial records
(ca. 60,060 acts in total).11 Of these proxy forms, 40 per cent were intended to enable a financial
operation on government annuities, 15 per cent were to facilitate an inheritance process, and
more than 20 per cent enabled the proxy to manage all or most of the principal’s properties (land,
9 We use "proxy form” to refer to the piece of paper recording the contract, and “power of attorney” to refer to the 
contract itself (it may or may not exist in writing).
10 For powers of attorney in the Amsterdam notarial archives, see Antunes and Silva, ‘Cross-cultural 
entrepreneurship’. Trivellato, Familiarity, mentions the use of powers of attorney in several European countries. For 
U.S. examples in our period, see e.g., Acker, Deeds, Smith and Owsley, eds., Papers, Price, ‘Manuscript sources’.
11 For Marseilles in 1751 we estimate they represent around 17% of all notarial records (ca. 11,280 acts). Less than 
1% of the 8,490 proxies in the 1851 Parisian records gave the power to represent a third party in court (attorney-at-
law): we are talking about attorneys-in-fact. 
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houses, companies).12 
Despite its centrality for the expansion of trade, its ubiquity in managing many aspects of
everyday economic life, and the fact that these contracts therefore had an important economic
impact, “scholars usually skip them [powers of attorney] as mere preliminaries or accessories to
the  more  complex  and specific  contracts”.13 It  is,  in  fact,  surprising  that  discussions  in  the
economics literature of principal-agent relationships have not, in the last decades, fostered more
interest in such contracts, as powers of attorney were the main, if not the only, legal vehicle for
such relationships in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Studying powers of attorney sheds
light on how agency problems were solved, and how actors matched and deployed contractual
terms to mitigate the risk of opportunism in agency. Even more puzzling is the absence of the
mention of powers of attorney in debates about trust in the economic literature.14 In contrast,
legal  scholarship  in  fiduciary law,  a  branch of  law which  deals  with  agency costs  plaguing
contracts such as powers of attorney, often portrays the latter as the epitome of interpersonal
trust. Unlike in contract and status relations where each party acts for her own benefit, the nature
of fiduciary relationships is that the fiduciary acts first and foremost for the benefit of another.
The  nature  of  agency  contracts  itself  defies,  then,  the  Weberian  Gemeinschaft  Gesellschaft
distinction.  We will maintain, however, a more cautious approach to the idea that a power of
attorney  is  just  the  legal  vehicle  for  preexisting  trust  and,  by  definition,  the  expression  of
preexisting personal commitments.15
12 Estimates derived from the rather crude classification of the online database ARNO, built by the French National 
Archives. We thank Gilles Postel-Vinay for access to an offline version of the database.
13 Lopez, ‘Proxy in medieval trade’, p. 189.
14 For a critical survey of the trust literature, see Guinnane, ‘Trust’. 
15 In a pioneering paper that attracted no followers, the French specialist of notarial records Jean-Pierre Poisson 
advocated for a systematic study of powers of attorney as the only way to quantify trust. Recently, a series of papers 
on both sides of the Atlantic treated them as evidence of trust put in wives by husbands traveling abroad. Poisson, 
‘Sociologie des actes de procuration’, Sturtz, ‘Virginia women'’, Dufournaud & Michon, ‘Les femmes et le 
commerce’, Cyr, ‘L'activité économique des femmes’, Grenier & Ferland, ‘Procurations et pouvoir féminin’, 
Palmer, Women and contracts’. Mostly ignoring one another, these papers generally deal with a few cases. The only 
systematic study, comparable in scope and sample size to ours but restricted to a rural region and purely descriptive, 
is that by Molina Jiménez, ‘Informe sobre las cartas poder’ and ‘Solidaridades, conflictos y derechos’.
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IWe developed our hypotheses in the context of a wider research project, which uses three
sets of sources to explore the narrative of a supposed decreasing embeddedness of commercial
relationships from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries.16 By “embeddedness”, we loosely
refer here to the “relational bases of social action in economic contexts”, or, in other words, to
the overlay of personal relationships, and especially communities,  in the incentives faced by
economic actors. 
Whereas  most  scholars would dismiss the received storyline as too crude,  the divide
between “early modern” and “modern” history in fact implicitly validates it. Recent monographs
in early modern history (sometimes including the early nineteenth century) that have offered
promising new, relational approaches to the study of long-distance trade have insisted on the
ways in which personal relationships could mitigate uncertainties or information asymmetries.
They seem to imply, however, that such relationships were not used anymore in later periods.17
Conversely, studies of the mid-nineteenth century often search for the roots of twentieth-century
modernity  by  selectively  studying  the  institutions  that  survived  the  transition,  for  instance,
modern banks and corporations, rather than attempting to tell the whole story and tracking how
the common practices of eighteenth-century trade evolved.18 
We therefore  focus  on the  1750–1850 period  in  order  to  test  the  commonly implicit
assumption that this was the period when economic relationships had become more modern by
becoming  less  personal  and,  especially,  less  embedded  in  families  or  ethnic  communities
(Hypothesis  0).  We focus  on  France  as  the  start  of  this  pilot  study (however,  some of  the
relationships we study involve other countries). France is a fertile testing ground for such a tale
of  modernization  because  the  new  legal  system  established  by  the  Revolution  and  the
Napoleonic codification of the 1800s facilitated impersonal market relationships. At the same
16 Along with powers of attorney, we investigate in a panel data of important merchant houses (1) the first letters in 
each merchant correspondence (‘lettres d’entrée en relation’) so as to understand what allowed some of the first 
letters attempting to start a relationship to be answered while others were not, and (2) the use of printed circulars 
(‘lettres circulaires’), a device that could be considered, at first glance, as less personal than the classical merchant 
correspondence. Those two sources only inform us about relationships among merchants (large-scale merchants, 
merchant-bankers), whereas powers of attorneys allow us to compare merchants with other professional groups.
17 See for example Hancock, Citizens of the world; Gervais et al., eds., Merchants; Marzagalli, Bordeaux.
18 Lemercier and Zalc, ‘New approach’, p. 666–71, discuss this pitfall.
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time,  transportation  innovations  in  canals  and  railways  from 1800  to  1850  fostered  market
expansion and, arguably, tested the limits of personal networks and social sanctions. All these
changes would be conducive to an increase of impersonal relationships and would furnish ideal
conditions for an abrupt transition, as predicted by the narrative. Crudely speaking, if there is one
place and time where and when the narrative would be true, that place would be France 1750–
1850. 
Exceptions to the implicit endorsement of North’s grand narrative exist in the historical
(and sociological) literature, and these exceptions provided us with alternative and more fine-
grained hypotheses to explain the patterns we observe in our data. We found that Jean-Pierre
Hirsch most clearly articulated Hypothesis 1. Hirsch stressed the importance of names, in the
context of merchants’ relationships, as signals for interpersonal trust well into the nineteenth
century, and showed that family businesses formalized their partnerships through a creative use
of the law to leverage their ties.19 A good name gave credit, in both the literal and metaphorical
senses of the word, but it had to be supplemented by formal devices.
Our Hypothesis 1 is, therefore, as broadly defined as Hypothesis 0, and contradicts it in
stating that personal and formal foundations of trust were generally used as complements, rather
than the former abruptly replacing the latter. Chandler articulated a version of this argument
when commenting on the fact  that nineteenth-century merchants were more specialized than
earlier ones and employed many agents, but chose them from among kin or long-time friends.20
In another important contribution showing the virtues of early family capitalism, Lamoreaux’
study of  nineteenth-century New England banks attributes  their  successful  role  in  providing
financing  to  the  practice  of  insider  lending,  in  which  banker-entrepreneurs  leveraged  their
personal relationships to  lend to  and monitor  each other.21 Yet  banks were not  mere kinship
networks: the bankers also used a specific legal vehicle, the corporation. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 question the dichotomy between personal relationships (generally
thought  of  as  embedded in  a  family or  ethnic community)  and impersonal  relationships,  by
19 Hirsch, Deux rêves.
20 Chandler, The visible hand.
21 Lamoreaux, Insider lending.
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suggesting other types of interactions that might have become more common during our period.
We posit that if relationships that were embedded in families or ethnic communities became less
important in the nineteenth century, this transition might imply their replacement by a different
type  of  specific,  interpersonal  relationship,  rather  than  anonymous  “arm's  length  market
relationships”.22 Hypothesis  2  focuses  on  relationships  that  are  created  either  by  repeated
economic  interactions,  generating  mutual  expectations,  or  that  arise  in  the  context  of
specialization. It draws inspiration from a literature in economic sociology that posits the notion
of “weak ties”, and generally warns against the “over-socialized” and “under-socialized” visions
of  economic  exchange,  which  Greif’s  and  North’s  ideal  types  embody.23 We  are  especially
interested in the idea that such relationships could be rooted in complementarity, or division of
labor;  in  other  words,  they would occur  between partners  who consider  themselves  as  quite
different  from  one  another  —  contrary  to  the  “personal”  relationships  of  Greif,  which  are
generally thought of as occurring within groups of people defined by their similarity with one
another (homophilic relationships, in sociological phrasing). 
Finally, Hypothesis 3 is informed by our reading of Francesca Trivellato’s assessment of
the social and linguistic norms of correspondence.24 She shows that knowing the right way to
write a business letter  could foster transactions between trans-oceanic partners with different
faiths and native languages. Being a merchant was something that could be learned (during our
period, increasing numbers of merchants’ handbooks taught correspondence), and, once learnt,
could  be  considered  as  a  signal  of  trustworthiness.  Rather  than  a  move  from  homophily
(relationships preferentially confined inside the family or community) to a relationship based on
division  of  labor  or  repeated  interactions  (Hypothesis  2),  we  could  observe  a  move  from
homophily based on innate qualities to an homophily based more broadly on the recognition of
each other as genuine merchants (Hypothesis 3).
22 Uzzi, ‘Source and consequences of embeddedness’, esp. p. 676.
23 Granovetter, ‘Economic action’.
24 Trivellato, Familiarity, ch. 7.
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II
Since little, if anything, is known about the uses of powers of attorney, our aim in this
paper is partly descriptive. We want to understand who used which type of proxy, for which type
of tasks, and what degree of discretion the proxies enjoyed. 
Because we are interested in changes occurring between the eighteenth and the nineteenth
centuries, we compare three samples: 1751, 1800, and 1851. The years 1751 and 1851 were
unexceptional politically and economically, and coincide with the dates of the digital database
(ARNO) of  all  Parisian  notarial  records,  which  provides  information  useful  to  selecting  the
notaries suitable to our study. Our use of the year 1800 as a midway check allows us to observe
the effects of the legal reforms instantiated by the French Revolution, before they were codified.
In the context of the revolutionary and then imperial wars, 1800 was relatively uneventful. The
year 1851 is situated after major changes in transportation due to the creation of canals and
railways  in  the  1820s–40s,  but  long  before  the  telegraph  began  to  be  routinely  used  for
commercial purposes. 
Our database covers four French cities: Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, and Lille. Each one had
an important commercial activity (focused on different regions of the world and tied to different
industries) and prominent merchants in our period.25 Paris, Lyons and Marseilles were the largest
cities in France by population and the most important commercial centers in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.26 We chose three notaries in each city, for each year, and collected a random
sample of the proxy forms registered that year, rather than using a random sample of all notarial
records (see Appendix 1). This latter solution would not have been very practical (except for
Paris in 1751 and 1851) due to the lack of a consolidated list of all notarial records (there were
dozens of notaries in each city). 
We tried to select those notaries who had the greatest number of merchants among their
clientele. We intentionally biased our data collection in favor of merchants, as they often play the
role of protagonists in the storyline of the rise of a commercial, impersonal society. Note that by
oversampling merchants, who in any case would be more prone to impersonal relationships, we
25 See e.g., Bergeron, Banquiers; Chassagne, Veuve Guerin et fils; Carrière, Négociants marseillais; Hirsch, 
Entreprise et institution.
26 Bairoch, Batou, and Chèvre, Population des villes européennes.
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make it easier to find the radical shift predicted by the narrative of modernity. 
For each proxy form, our database records a dozen variables referring to the proxy form,
from its length to the existence of diverse restrictive or discretionary clauses; in addition, we
coded each of the tasks the proxy was entitled to perform for the principal, along with the main
object  of the agency contract,  and variables describing the profession or social  status of the
principal, the proxy, and their relationships. (See descriptive statistics on all our variables in
Appendix 2).
A caveat to our sample is that a power of attorney could be granted, and considered as
such in courts, without being notarized. It is therefore likely that the vast majority of powers of
attorney did not survive –– or even were never written, or written as such. An oral order, or the
order to do something included in an ordinary letter, could be considered valid by a court, both
before and after the French Revolution.27 In addition, one way to make the contract more official
while paying less than a notarial fee was to have it registered (acte sous seing privé), which left
few usable traces in the archives.28 Although it is possible that we are working with a small,
nonrepresentative subsample of the contracts a lawyer would consider as powers of attorney, the
vast quantities of notarized powers of attorney, which alone fill miles of notarial archives, are
significant enough to warrant attention. Moreover, some powers had to be notarized: hence, the
large number of powers for transactions on annuities found in the archives. The proxy might
have needed to prove to third parties her legitimacy to conclude a binding deal, especially when
her authority was not apparent, i.e., the principal and the proxy were not linked through family
ties, or the proxy had to perform tasks far away from the principal’s location. Finally, it is likely
that powers of attorney were notarized if high stakes were involved (such as general powers to
manage the properties of a person), or because the parties anticipated that they might have to go
27 The Civil Code required written proof for powers of attorney whose subject matter exceeded the value of 150FF. 
If the object was commercial, witnesses could, however, substitute the written proof, independently of the value 
(Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’, p. 682).
28 The notarial fees to write a proxy form were never officially standardized, but the total expenses incurred for a 
notarized form seems to have been, in Paris, ca. 2–2.5 livres before the Revolution and 17–25FF after the 
Revolution (in other cities, the sums were a bit lower). This amounts to ca. 10 days of work for a male unskilled 
worker. Written, registered, but nonnotarized proxy forms (actes sous seing privé) only had to pay a registration tax 
of ca. 10 sols, then a little more than 1FF (half a day of work). There are traces of their registration in the archives, 
but they very often give only the date and the names of the parties. On notarial fees, see Amiaud, Le Tarif Général; 
and Mourlon and Jeannest-Saint-Hilaire, Formulaire Général.
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to court. Whereas non-notarized and even non-written contracts could be admitted as evidence,
the many ongoing jurisprudential debates, both before and after the Revolution,29 suggest that
leaving judges to apply default rules could be a risky strategy; on the other hand, devising more
complete, official contracts could have its virtues. 
All  this  implies  that,  in  contrast  to  the  nineteenth  century  depictions  on  powers  of
attorney being increasingly used as a vehicle of interpersonal trust, finding a notarized proxy
form does not signify an especially high level of trust between the parties, but some measure of
distrust (e.g., because of too little information, or little likelihood of sanction by social norms)
that had to be mitigated by reliance on the legal system as a credible threat of sanction. The data
at hand does not make it easy to discriminate as to the direction of the bias introduced by self-
selection into notarizing the proxy form, although the length and phrasing of forms give us some
hints (see Part III).
III
Taken  at  face  value,  Hypothesis  0  posits  an  evolution  from  embedded  contracts,
enforceable  through  social  sanctions,  to  more  formal  contracts, enforceable  thanks to  legal
institutions. If true, this would imply that we should observe in our sample an increase over time
in formalization, which would be translated into contractual features such as length and phrasing
of the contracts. In addition, it seems likely that powers given to members of the same family or
community would be less lengthy and detailed,  whereas  powers given to complete  strangers
would try to provide a more complete version of the contract and, especially, include clauses
limiting the discretion of the proxy. As we only observe notarized powers of attorney –– the most
formal of all  –– and those that might have been intended to be used as evidence in courts, one
would expect the samples to commonly include lengthy clauses limiting the proxies’ discretion. 
As depicted in Table 1, the length of the contract varies considerably according to the
29 Hundreds of pages were written on the topic. Our discussion of legal debates, below, is mostly based on Pothier, 
‘Traité du contrat de mandat’; Troplong, Le droit civil expliqué; Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’, and the surveys by 
Xifaras, ‘Science sociale’, and Pfister, ‘Un contrat en quête d’identité’.
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type of task.30 Within each category, the more general the power given to the proxy, the longer
the contract that had to enumerate all the tasks deriving from it. For example, managing land
included managing harvests, tenants, repairing buildings, etc. Forty-five per cent of the contracts
mention the possibility to go to court (generally listing all courts that could be used and the
stages of the judicial process), whereas representation in court was the main object of only 4 per
cent of our proxy forms. Notaries apparently considered that it was better to enumerate all the
tasks that the proxy was authorized to perform, even though two-thirds of forms began with the
phrase “procuration générale et spéciale”, intended to cover tasks derived from the main ones,
and ended with general clauses stating even more clearly that actions not explicitly described in
the contract were also authorized. For example, a frequent expression found at the end of proxy
forms, used with kin as well as with professionals, was “whatever the case might require, without
further power of attorney”.31
Table 1: Length of the contract according to the main task to be performed
Task\Length ≤1 page (%) 1-2 pages (%) >2 pages (%) No. of contracts
Doing everything 10 52 38 21
Inheritance or managing
land, buildings or company 14 64 22 254
Other 35 58 7 604
Note: Chi-square test: prob < 0.001. Fisher exact test (rows 1 and 2 vs. 3, columns 1 vs. 2 and 3): prob < 0.001
We found no evidence  within  the  categories  listed in  Table  1 that  contracts  between
spouses, kin, employer and employee, etc., were less detailed than non-kin, or that merchants, as
30 Note that as the size of the notary registers did not change during the period under analysis, any differences in the
number of pages can be attributed to differences in the length of the contract. While the calligraphy of each 
individual notary may have varied, we did not observe any relevant changes over time in the calligraphy of notaries 
as a group. Therefore, the number of pages as a unit of analysis is the closest indication for contractual length, given 
that a word count of each act would be a herculean task.
31 In French, ‘tout ce que le cas requerra, sans avoir besoin de plus amples pouvoirs’. This clause is, for example, 
found in Archives départementales du Rhône (henceforth ADR), 3 E / 22990, proxy form of 23 ventôse an 8 (13 
March 1800), given by the Lyonese bookseller Pierre Bernufet to his wife Marguerite Derville to manage his 
business. In the same year and city, but with a different notary (ADR 3 E / 9197), the propertied citizen (rentier) 
François Piquet used the same clause when appointing citizen Mollière, the notary of Saint-Symphorien-le-Château, 
a small village in Eure-et-Loir, ca. 500 km away from Lyons, to recover the price of the sale of a farm and to sell 
objects that had been seized from the buyer.
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principals, signed shorter or longer contracts than average. The main pattern that we find is an
evolution between our three dates (Table 2). Proxy forms were significantly longer in 1800 than
in 1751; but in 1851 their length had decreased, going back to the level of 1751. In 1800, the
revolution had abolished many Old Regime laws, but it was not necessarily clear which rules
remained in force, and codification was not yet finished. Notaries might have written longer
powers  of  attorney  at  that  time  in  order  to  protect  their  clients  from the  legal  uncertainty
following the revolution. Although the jurisprudence was far from settled by 1851, the “law in
the  books”  was  more  established  and  well  known.  In  sum,  we  find  no  evidence  of  linear
modernization here.
Table 2: Length of contracts for the simple tasks over time
Task\Length ≤1 page (%) 1-2 pages (%) >2 pages (%) No. of contracts
1751 Other (see Table 1) 41 49 11 210
1800 Other (see Table 1) 13 83 4 175
1851 Other (see Table 1) 46 47 7 219
Notes:  “Simple  tasks”  includes  all  main  tasks  except  doing  everything  for  the  proxy,  managing  inheritance
proceedings, land, buildings or a company. Chi-square test: prob < 0.001. The same trends were found for more
complex contracts, but the contrasts are not significant
If we turn to the phrasing of contracts, what is striking is that clauses giving instructions
on how perform one of the tasks gave more, not less discretion to the proxies. For example, they
made it explicit that a sale could be either direct (de gré à gré) or in an auction (aux enchères).
Pothier, writing in the 1760’s, explicitly discussed the interpretation of prices given in powers of
attorney – stating that a selling price should be interpreted as a minimum threshold and a buying
price as a maximum threshold32 (Lopez describes such clauses in medieval contracts.33). Pothier
also insisted on the fact that the principal would ultimately have to agree on the price paid or
received. However, almost none of our contracts mention specific prices, and many explicitly
state, in their final clause, that the principal promises to “agree to the terms determined by the
32 Pothier, 'Traité du contrat de mandat'.
33 Lopez, ‘Proxy in medieval trade’.
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proxy” (avoir le tout pour agréable) or, in 35 cases, to ratify all the actions of the proxy.34 Only 6
per cent of our contracts include any kind of restriction on the proxy’s discretion (e.g., he has to
discuss with the principal before making some decisions), or specific parameters of how a certain
task is to be executed (e.g., the length of leases the proxy has to decide on). On the contrary,
many  use  long  clauses  that  emphasize  the  proxy’s  discretion:  for  example,  he  can  sign  a
settlement, in a bankruptcy proceeding for instance, even at a loss.35 One of the most frequent
phrases, which appears for many auxiliary tasks, is “as he [the agent] will find convenient” (ce
que le mandataire jugera convenable). In addition to that, final clauses often added the idea that
the proxy should do “as the circumstances will dictate” (ce que les circonstances exigeront) or
“what will be useful” (tout ce qui sera utile). In 1851, we find shorter final clauses stating, “and
generally do whatever is necessary” (et généralement faire le nécessaire or  tout ce qui sera
nécessaire),  which  seems to  indicate  the  routinization  of  maximum discretion  for  the  proxy
(Table 3). 
Table 3: Final short discretionary clause “do whatever is necessary”
Year\City Lille Lyons Marseilles Paris
% in 1751 8 0 2 2
% in 1800 35 1 0 7
% in 1851 86 38 28 63
% in Total (Total No.) 46 (102) 12 (239) 17 (262) 25 (134)
Chi-square test prob
1751 and 1800 vs. 1851 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Note: This table only includes the forms that had a final clause (142 had none)
34 These cases are found in all cities except Lille, but only one occurred in 1751, which points in the same direction 
as the more robust results of Table 3. The clause was used by three different Londoners, in 1851, to have the Parisian
banker Ferrère-Laffitte recover annuities for them in Paris, as well as by the celibate Marseillaise cook Marie Sophie
Franchette Cornut, in the same year, who gave blank powers to deal with her father's inheritance; he was a 
blacksmith who had died in Switzerland. (The other cases generally did not involve parties abroad.) AN, 
MC/ET/X/1216, 2 February 1851 (deposit of proxy form drawn in London, 24 January 1851); AN, MC/ET/X/1217, 
4 April 1851 (31 March); AN, MC/ET/X/1220, 3 December 1851 (6 October); Archives départementales des 
Bouches-du-Rhône (henceforth ADBR), 364E640, 7 April 1851.
35 ‘même à perte de finance’. This clause is present in 25 of our cases –– mostly, but not only, in Marseilles in 1751.
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Conversely,  final  clauses that  explicitly stated that  the proxy could do “whatever  the
principal could have done if he or she had been present” (tout ce que le constituant pourrait faire
lui-même s'il était présent en personne), or could have done if “in person”, tended to disappear
(Table 4). Interestingly, their frequency varied greatly among our cities in the eighteenth century
(probably due to different local notarial customs), but decreased everywhere over time. Giving a
power of attorney could more often be a way to get something done that one, despite being
present,  was not able/capable to do it himself – so that you can be drawn to give a power of
attorney even if you are present. This testifies to the very thing that some nineteenth-century
lawyers feared was happening: the disappearance of the phrase “do all the things the constituent
[the principal] would do if he/she was present” suggests that powers of attorney were used to hire
experts, or at least proxies who had more knowledge or experience than the principal, in order to
conduct specialized transactions. This type of division of labor could lead to choices supporting
either Hypothesis 0 (a more impersonal choice of proxies) or Hypothesis 2 (a choice of proxies
based on professional skills, that could include repeated choices of the same proxy by the same
principal).
Table 4: Final discretionary clause “whatever the principal could do in person”
Year\City Lille Lyons Marseilles Paris
% in 1751 39 41 73 9
% in 1800 31 15 50 0
% in 1851 0 0 5 0
% in Total (Total No.) 7 (102) 25 (239) 66 (262) 2 (134)
Chi-square (Lyons, Marseilles) or Fisher (Lille, Paris) test prob
1751 vs. 1800 and 1851 <0.05 <0.001 <0.001 <0.01
Note: This table only includes the forms that had a final clause (142 had none). 
IV
Moving from a description of the phrasing and length of contracts  to a  study of  the
relationships between the principal and the proxy and their occupations allows us to further test
our hypotheses. The explicit mentions of relationships in the proxy forms are directly relevant in
testing for Hypotheses 0 and 1. We code the identities of principals and proxies as well, which
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we use to test for the presence of frequent proxies and to track the growing professionalization of
proxies (Hypothesis 2). Finally, we test for homophilic preferences for some types of proxies
among merchants (Hypothesis 3).
Having surveyed a large quantity of notarized proxy forms, we are confident that the
types of relationships that could be recorded in the source (kinship ties in 17 per cent of cases,
including 5 per cent of spouses; and employer-employee, associates, etc., in 3 per cent of cases)
were exhaustively included in the forms. (The exception is neighbors: some addresses showed
that the two lived in the same building or street, which was not explicitly pointed out by the
contract, but which we considered as a likely personal tie.) This leaves a vast majority of cases
without  any explicit  preexisting  relationship  between  the  parties.  Even  if  we  exclude  blank
forms, which we will discuss below, 80 per cent of powers did not contain any information on
the relationship between the parties. This does not mean that the interactions represented by these
80 per  cent  were completely anonymous.  Apart  from the possibility of repeated interactions
(Hypothesis 2, which we will discuss below), the obvious case is that of “friendship,” the ideal-
type used by lawyers to characterize powers of attorney. The parties and the notaries did not use,
however, the vocabulary of friendship in any way, be it purely rhetorical or not, in the contracts;
they  did  not  give  any  hints  either  about  citizenship,  religion,  or  any  other  basis  for
communitarian solidarity. It is of course possible that many principals knew their proxies before
giving them powers, and even were close to them. In addition, it could be argued that,  ceteris
paribus, the closer the preexisting relationship, the less the power would need to be notarized.
This could be true because social norms would make formalization less necessary (by ensuring
that  no  dispute  would  occur,  or  that  disputes  would  be  dealt  with  inside  the  family  or
community) or for legal reasons. For example, Art. 1432 of the Civil Code explicitly stated that
each  spouse  tacitly  had  the  power  to  manager  the  other’s  property;  nineteenth-century
jurisprudence accepted oral powers without further proof if the principal and proxy were kin or
“commensaux” (eating together –– i.e., presumably living in the same household).36 From this
point of view, the fact that we find as high as 17 per cent of notarized forms given to kin is rather
interesting regarding a demand for formalization of even the most embedded relationships ––
36 Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’.
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which would support our Hypothesis 1.
What we can more firmly state from our data –– in addition to the fact that men giving
notarized  powers  to  women  was  a  rather  rare  occurrence  (see  Appendix  2)  ––  is  that  the
relationships  between  principals  and  proxies,  in  the  notarized  contracts,  did  not  change
significantly from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, and that merchants did not behave
differently from other social  groups in choosing between kin and non-kin proxies (Table 5).
More precisely, the total proportion of proxies given to kin was significantly higher in 1800 than
in 1851, but there was no significant difference between 1751 and 1851. 1800 might not stand
out in a larger sample; if it did, it could, once again, be a result of post–French Revolution legal
uncertainties, but definitely not of linear depersonalization. Moreover, a similar share of proxy
forms given to kin (24 per cent, including 11 per cent between spouses) was found in Parisian
records of the 1960s, despite their being quite different from ours in terms of the tasks to be
performed (no debt  recoveries,  inheritance proceedings,  or management  of estates,  but  more
sales and loans than in our period).37
Table 5: Evolution in the relationships between principal and proxy
Year\City Spouses Other kin Other % explicit rel. No. of contracts
% in 1751 6 18 4 72 189
% in 1800 11 18 5 66 204
% in 1851 6 12 4 78 187
% in Total 8 16 5 72 580
% from merchants 7 17 5 72 80
Notes: Calculations exclude blank (and filled-in blank) forms. “Other” mostly includes neighbors (living in the same
house  or  street,  something  that  we deduced  but  usually  was  not  explicitly  stated),  along with a  few employees,
associates, co-creditors, etc.
The  pattern  worth  exploring  about  these  relationships  is  not  their  correlation  with  a
period or social position of the principal but the choice of different types or proxies for different
types of tasks (Table 6). Proxies in inheritance proceedings, but also those who had to perform a
wide menu of tasks generally,  were significantly more often members of the family than the
agents who were chosen for a simpler task (and spouses hold 44 per cent of the 23 general
37 Poisson, ‘Sociologie des actes de procuration’.
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powers of attorney). This distinction in complexity seems much more meaningful here than that
between  commercial  and  noncommercial  tasks.  Dealing  with  annuities,  a  task  increasingly
performed by professionals (brokers, bankers), is the only one where more than 90 per cent of
cases do not note any explicit relationship.38 The fact that 13 out of 27 non-blank proxy forms to
manage a company are given inside the family, 3 to neighbors, 1 to an associate, and 1 to an
employee, is particularly noteworthy. Management of a business is by far (67 per cent of cases)
the type of power for which the most explicit ties are recorded. Anecdotal evidence from a study
of printed circulars from the nineteenth century hints that such general powers of attorney was
one step in commercial careers, used to further integrate young relatives and sometimes long-
serving employees in a company before making them full partners.39 
Table 6: Relationships between principal and proxy, according to the task to be performed
% of proxies who are spouses or otherwise part of kin
Doing everything for the principal 53* Total 24
Managing a company 48* Selling-other (mostly merchandise) 19
Managing land and/or buildings 38* Representation in court 16
Dealing with inheritance 35* Recovering debts 15*
Selling land and/or buildings 31 Other commercial matter 10
Other non-commercial matter 25 Selling annuities or collecting interest 7*
Notes: Calculations exclude blank (and filled-in blank) forms. *: Chi-square test of kin vs. non-kin x task vs. all other
tasks is significant at the 0.05 level
Proxy forms do not inform us of about the embeddedness of commercial relationships in
friendship or communitarian ties. They, however, allow us to test our Hypothesis 3 –– that is, a
38 We also tested for differences between periods in the percentage of kin used for the groups of main tasks with a 
number of non-blank observations superior to 50. We found no significant differences for the management of land 
and/or buildings, of inheritance proceedings, and for debt recovery. On the contrary, the increase in the proportion of
proxies chosen out of kin to deal with annuities (from 74% to 87% to 100%) was significant.
39 See e.g., a brother and employee (Centre d'archives du monde du travail, 69AQ/3, sent to Foache from Le Havre, 
1 January 1824), a brother-in-law (Archives municipales de Marseille, Fonds Roux, LIX-164, sent from Bordeaux, 1
June 1816), a son (Le Havre, 1 July 1826), and long-time employees (Le Havre, 1 January 1828, 28 August 1817, 10
April 1830,1 March 1824) promoted to proxy (sometimes explicitly as a ‘testimony of our trust’), another son 
promoted from proxy to partner (Le Havre, 1 January 1827), a long-time proxy of the father, then of his son, finally 
becoming a partner (Le Havre, 1 June 1814).
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broad version of the language homophily found by Trivellato.40 Does the mere fact of being a
merchant matter to fellow merchants when it comes to choosing a proxy? In our period, the
words  marchand,  négociant, and  commissionnaire, which we have used to define the category
“merchant”, were still used with Old Regime social statuses in mind: they denoted wholesale
operations and some degree of recognition by fellow merchants as being part of a local elite.41
Therefore,  if  merchants  as  principals  exhibit  some  preference  for  merchants  as  proxies  ––
whereas, commercial occupations generally (our category ECO, which also includes bankers,
manufacturers,  employees  of  merchants,  artisans,  etc.)  did  not  show  the  same  degree  of
homophily –– we could interpret this as denoting preference for a social group, not only for the
skills  associated  with  persons  performing  commercial  transactions.  Such  an  interpretation
should, of course, be accepted with much caution at this stage, and we will look for confirmation
in a closer study of some cases (i.e., by looking for our “merchants” in other sources to try to
assess their wealth, reputation, exact location in the city, etc.; and by looking for reciprocated
principal-proxy ties in our notaries’ inventories for other years). In our future work we will also
extend the sample so as to be able to use multivariate statistics on the whole sample to control for
the fact that merchants clearly used merchants more often as proxies to recover debts (28 cases
out of 37 in our current sample) than to deal with inheritance or sales of land (4 cases out of 17):
skills as well as social proximity played a role. Bearing in mind this caveat, we can still state that
no other occupation group (except for financial, which comprises only 3 observations) exhibits
the same degree of preference for proxies drawn from the same category, or for merchants as
proxies,  and  that  the  preference  for  merchants  among  merchants  is  much  stronger  than  the
general preference for commercial occupations (ECO) among commercial occupations (Table 7).
40 Trivellato, Familiarity.
41 Carrière, Négociants marseillais.
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Table 7: Occupations of principals and proxies
Principal\Proxy % merchant % ECO % same cat. as principal No. of contracts
merchant 47 66 47 101
financial 33 100 67 3
employee of merch. 18 73 9 11
other eco 18 72 31 71
ECO 34 69 69 186
civil servant 26 55 13 47
lawyer 7 47 33 15
propertied 9 41 23 78
other 14 45 21 29
Total 25 58 355
Notes: Calculations exclude blank forms but include filled-in blank forms. Unknown occupations are excluded on both
sides. ECO is a sub-total of the four categories above (merchant, financial, employee of merchant, other eco). Chi-
square test on merchant vs other x merchant vs other table: ≈3x10-9. Chi-square test on ECO vs other x ECO vs other
table: prob≈2x10-5.
An interesting  anecdotal  case  hints  that  those  self-identifying  as  merchants  could  be
considered, by fellow merchants, better proxies than others. In our study of printed circulars, we
found  a  former  merchant,  a  certain  Bruguière  (who  pointed  out  that  he  even  had  been  a
commercial judge in Nîmes and Marseilles), advertising for his new company, which offered
services of representation in courts and, more broadly, before the authorities. Bruguière stated
both that this sort of business required full-time dedication and that a former merchant would
provide better services than any other person. Of course, he would have had to use licensed
attorneys to go to court, but his skill as a professional proxy, knowledgeable about the needs of
merchants,  would be to find the best  attorneys.42 This Bruguière argued against using active
merchants  as  proxies,  at  least  in  the  context  of  litigation,  because  it  would  harm  local
friendships; but he used the mutual recognition among merchants to promote his new business.
We do not know whether he succeeded –– the Lyonese bank, in whose records we found his
printed circular, did not reply to his advertisement –– but his rhetoric points to both the signaling
power of the label “merchant” among peers and to the possibility of envisioning the role of proxy
as a full-time job.
42 Archives municipales de Lyon, Fonds Veuve Guérin, 4J331, sent by Bruguière aîné, ‘agent de commerce’ in 
Marseilles, 1 May 1809.
20
Although clearly naming the proxies in only 396 out of 8,490 cases, the ARNO database
of all notarized contracts drawn in Paris in 1851 already allows us to identify 12 proxies who
were chosen as agents in at least 3 different proxy forms (this represents a total of 55, or 14 per
cent, of the 396 proxy forms with identifiable names). Among these 12 men, 3 were lawyers, 3
clerks of notaries, 3 “propertied men”, 1 notary, and 2 occupations are not stated. In contrast, in
752 cases in which the proxy’s name is known for the 1751 ARNO database, we find only 3
proxies  appearing  at  least  3  times,  corresponding  to  a  total  of  14  forms  (2  per  cent  of  all
identifiable forms). Our sample, despite its modest size, confirmed the existence of such frequent
proxies in other cities in 1851, but not at the 2 other dates. In some cases, the proxies’ legal or
financial profession required them to use proxy forms; other proxies seem to have been almost
full-time attorneys-in-fact, performing a variety of tasks for several different principals.
Two brokers at the Lille stock exchange in 1851, Frédéric Tattet fils and Joseph Jules
Blerzy, used several different notaries, bringing their own standard proxy forms with them. The
local  professional  organization,  Compagnie  des  agents  de  change,  might  have  provided
standardized forms. All their contracts look the same, independently of which notary registered
them. In Paris, also in 1851, the banker Ferrère-Laffitte was a proxy in many contracts dealing
with  the  sale  or  collection  of  interest  from annuities,  like  Tattet  and  Blerzy.  Unlike  them,
however, he used slightly different phrasings according to his principals’ notaries; one of the
forms, coming from a notary in Jersey, was even printed.43 Some professionals who often acted
as  proxies  therefore used notaries  to  certify their  contracts,  but  did not  really need them to
provide templates.
If we focus on proxies appearing at least four times in our sample, along with our three
brokers, comprising 56 contracts, we find three other interesting cases: Étienne Maurice Olivier,
a notary’s clerk; Joseph Darasse, a merchant; Louis Montagne, only described as a “propertied
man”. Olivier and Montagne resided in Lille, Darasse in Paris; they were proxies in at least five,
four, and six contracts, respectively, in 1851 (we found Montagne’s in the records of one notary
among the three in our sample, Olivier’s in two, Darasse’s in one). Their repeated role as proxies
was not a direct consequence of their profession, as with Tattet,  Blerzy, and Ferrère-Laffitte.
43 AN, MC/ET/X/1220, 15 December 1851 
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They  performed  diverse  tasks  related  to  the  management  of  inheritance  proceedings,  the
management and sale of lands and buildings, or debt recovery. Darasse offers an interesting case
of repeated interactions: he was chosen by six separate representatives of France abroad (five
diplomats who appointed him to recover their overdue wages at the ministry of Foreign Affairs,
while one of the diplomats asked for annuities to be sold, and one professor at the French School
of Athens)44. He had obviously made a reputation among employees of the ministry as a reliable
proxy,  so much so that  one of  the forms had been drawn in Tbilissi,  Georgia,  before being
deposited in the records of Darasse’s customary notary. Choosing him was clearly nothing like
an impersonal decision. 
Montagne and Olivier, however, resembled the ideal-type of the professional proxy more
than  the  merchant  Darasse  did.  Conservative  lawyers,  as  well  as  nineteenth-century  writers
generally, were very much concerned about this type of individual whose only business was to
manage the business of others. As their role as proxies would necessarily call for compensation
beyond expenses  (although the  forms  never  explicitly  stated  it),  they threatened the  Roman
definition of “power of  attorney” as  a  voluntarily accepted assignment  from a friend.  Often
called  agents d’affaires (business agents, with a negative connotation), they would perform all
sorts of tasks as proxies, or in other variously defined positions –– for example, as arbitrators for
commercial  courts,  trustees  in  bankruptcies,  etc.  Historians  have  sometimes  mentioned their
importance  and  bad  reputation,45 but  very  little  is  known  about  them  as  a  social  group.
Identifying individuals such as Olivier and Montagne and looking for their other contracts in the
notaries’ directories,  beyond our three 1-year  samples,  would offer insight  on these business
agents and their growing importance. 
44 AN, MC/ET/LXXVI. Box 811: 5 and 26 February 1851; box 812-813: 8 Marc 1851; box 814-815: 19 July and 1 
September 1851; box 816-817: 23 Decembre 1851.
45 Boigeol and Dezalay, ‘De l’agent d’affaires au barreau’.
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VFinally, one of our most interesting findings is the high proportion of notarized proxy
forms that were either blank (27 per cent) –– that is, no name or function was given for the
proxy, just a blank space –– or originally blank and filled in later (7 per cent), in which the name,
and often occupation and address of the proxy, were written in a different handwriting. Two-
thirds of the filled-in blank proxy forms are ‘deposits’: the proxy filled in his name, then had the
form recorded by his notary. Nineteenth-century lawyers made little or no mention of such a
practice. Conservatives among them would certainly have deemed it a betrayal of the original
idea of the power of attorney as a vehicle for interpersonal trust, a practice typical of modernity
and/or merchants. Except perhaps for Marseilles, our data does not point to any trend over time
(Table 8). Interestingly, a similar share of blank forms appeared in notarial records of the 1960s.46
This evidence tends to confirm the lack of support for Hypothesis 0; it is likely that there was no
modernization in this respect, at least from the eighteenth-century onward.
Table 8: Evolution in the use of blank forms and substitution clauses
Year\City Lille Lyons Marseilles Paris
% in 1751 18//35 44//59 25//60 42//42
% in 1800 29//45 36//64 33//66 16//81
% in 1851 29//33 54//38 62//67 7//79
Note: For each cell: % Blank// % Substitution. Both blank forms and filled-in blank forms are included. Both general
and partial substitutions are included.
Evidence  on  the  use  of  substitution  clauses  leads  to  the  same  conclusion  (Table  8).
Substitution clauses, which, with a few exceptions, have not drawn a lot of scholarly attention
either, allowed the proxy to choose another proxy, who would perform all or some of the tasks
included in the power of attorney. Forty-seven per cent of the forms in our sample included a
final, general substitution clause. Around 23 per cent of all proxy forms (some of which might or
might not contain a final general substitution clause) mentioned a specific task that could be
performed by a person chosen by the proxy, who would often represent the principal in court, or
46 Poisson, ‘Sociologie des actes de procuration’.
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perform  transactions  for  him/her  at  the  stock  exchange:  tasks  that  only  a  licensed
solicitor/attorney/barrister (avocat / avoué) or broker was authorized to perform. This suggests
that principals might have chosen nonprofessionals as proxies for a general power of attorney,
even  if  the  general  task  to  be  performed  included  auxiliary  tasks  that  would  have  to  be
subcontracted to professionals, and that many principals left the choice of these professionals to
their proxy. As Table 8 shows, there were no clear trends over time in the use of substitution
clauses allowing this modern form of delegation –– a finding that also undermines Hypothesis 0.
In the frequent case of a general substitution clause, the proxy could be only the first
person in a chain of delegation of powers. Indeed, we found 31 substitution contracts in our
sample –– that is, forms in which the first proxy transferred powers to a second one, without any
explicit intervention of the principal. It is likely that many other substitutions occurred without
being notarized, especially when they were partial and/or provisional.
As expected, general and partial substitution clauses were found more often in the longest
contracts (more than one page). Table 9 shows that such clauses were slightly more frequent
when commercial,  rather than civil,  tasks were described (if we take into account the length
associated with each task in interpretation), although this would have to be confirmed by a larger
sample. Merchants, as principals, did not, however, use this clause significantly more often than
other professional categories. 
Table 9: Use of substitution clauses depending on the main task in the power (%)
Other non-commercial matter 29* Dealing with inheritance 62
Representation in court 36* Managing land and/or buildings64
Other commercial matter 39* Recovering debts 67*
Selling land and/or buildings 43* Selling-other (mostly merchandise) 75
Selling annuities or collecting interest 43* Managing a company 82*
Total 57 Doing everything for the principal 91*
Total–principal is a merchant 60
Notes: Includes general and partial substitution clauses. *: Chi-square test is significant at the 0.05 level (task vs. all
other tasks)
This qualifies the relational interpretation of powers of attorney as manifestations of trust
that we find among nineteenth-century lawyers –– a view that persists to our day, and the sharp
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divide  built  by  contemporaries  between  powers  given  among  equals  and  those  given  to
professionals,  as  the  former  could  be  a  first  step  toward  the  latter.  A proxy  form  with  a
substitution clause could indicate that the proxy chosen by the principal was entrusted not so
much to perform the task, or all the tasks, as to find reliable agents to do so. It points in the
general direction of Hypothesis 1, that principals and proxies apparently used powers of attorney
in ways that allowed them to leverage both personal relationships and professional skills.
Blank (and filled-in blank) forms can be interpreted similarly in that drawing a proxy
form could be just one step in a relational chain.47 Contrary to our findings regarding substitution
clauses, merchants (as principals) used blank forms more often than other professional groups. It
is all the more interesting because one could consider that using a blank form was a deliberate
choice by the principal, whereas inserting a standardized substitution clause could be something
the notary did or did not casually suggest to all his clients, who then did or did not accept.
Why would principals, especially merchants, use blank forms, then, and why notarize
them? The likelihood is that, in many cases, this had something to do with the place in which the
task was to be performed – something that we have found surprisingly difficult to code because it
is very seldom explicitly mentioned. Perhaps the principal did not know that place well, but it
was the place where the deceased had lived, or the debtor was currently located, and so on; thus,
it might be useful to find a still-unknown proxy there, rather than to employ someone known by
the principal but located in the wrong place. For example, Jean-Charles Galhaut, a merchant in
Amiens, head of the Galhaut & Thibaut company, sought to recover 2,000 FF (equivalent to the
yearly wages of a clerk) from a Lyonnaise company, for merchandise he had sold them and for
which they had not paid. His blank proxy form for this task was recorded almost one year later,
in Lyons, filled in with the name of a company, not a person, as proxy (‘Bourget père et fils aîné
de Lyon’).48 
The role of French notaries in the circulation of economic information and the matching
of  contract  partners  has  already been  well  documented.49 Lawyers  writing  about  powers  of
47 Grossetti et al., ‘Studying relational chains’.
48 ADR, 3E/12868, deposit of 1er ventôse an 8 (20 February 1800), proxy form of 28 ventôse an 7 (18 March 
1799).
49 Hoffman et al., Priceless markets.
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attorney commented on the growing trust clients put in their notaries.50 Such commentators were
talking about notaries acting as proxies, though, not as intermediaries used to find proxies. In our
current database among the non-blank forms in which the occupation is provided, we only find
14 proxies explicitly described as notaries and 18 as clerks of a notary –– that is, 7 per cent of the
documented  cases  –  but,  of  course,  we  do  not  know  who  eventually  performed  the  tasks
described in the 27 per cent of blank forms. More interestingly, but not very conclusively due to
the small  number of cases, 7 out of the 48 filled-in blank forms (15 per cent)  in which the
proxy’s occupation is known were given to notaries or clerks, as compared to 6 per cent of the
non-blank forms; barristers and civil  servants also seem to have been overrepresented in the
filled-in blank forms.  Similarly to  what  the  literature  has  shown about  the search  for  credit
partners, our principals could have trusted their notary to look for a proper proxy and provide
him with the blank form, which the proxy would then fill in with his name and sometimes record
with his own notary. When the task had to be performed in a distant place, the notary in that
place could be used as an intermediary to find an adequate proxy. It is not easy to empirically
confirm this interpretation, though.51 What we can confirm is that the use of blank forms, and
what that use implies regarding the complementarity between personal and formal relationships
and the role of repeated interactions, was in no way specific to the nineteenth century, as opposed
to the eighteenth.
VI
Despite  having  carefully  chosen  a  case  study  in  which  macro  events  (the  French
Revolution and the “industrial” revolution) arguably were likely to transform incentives, leading
to less interpersonal, more formal powers of attorney, we have found little or no support in our
data for the simplest modernization narrative (Hypothesis 0). As this storyline was shared by
many contemporaries and is very much present, if sometimes implicitly and in the background,
in historical  and economic  scholarship  today,  this  is  in  itself  a  useful  result.  We found few
50 Dalloz and Dalloz, ‘Mandat’.
51 On the contrary, it is possible that some principals kept their forms blank because they did not want their notary 
to use information about their proxies.
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significant changes between our periods, and those did not point the direction of increasingly
anonymous  and formal  relationships.  At  a  micro  level,  political  and legal  changes  from the
Revolution  and  Napoleonic  codification  seem  mostly  to  have  played  the  role  of  a  minor
disruption, introducing legal uncertainty during the time of change itself.
On the basis of the empirical evidence revealed by this study, we cannot rule out that a
radical  shift  in  the  depersonalization  of  powers  of  attorney  had  occurred  before  the  mid-
eighteenth century. This result is consistent with a recent literature uncovering through careful
empirical analysis of contracts the institutional micro foundations for impersonal exchange.52 In
each  case,  incentives  for  transactions  to  cross  business  networks  were  found  earlier  than
generally thought. In agreement with these studies, our sources do not paint a picture of a purely
anonymous market in which trust relied solely on formal institutions. Our goal was to provide a
more fine-grained micro-level account of differently specified types of economic interactions,
which appeared in a century that is usually depicted by an extreme account of depersonalization
and anonymity. 
In this vein, some preliminary results point in the direction of a complementarity between
trust based on pre-existing relationships, especially among kin, and formalization, rather than a
substitution over time (Hypothesis 1). The very use of the most formal contracts, notarized proxy
forms, between relatives, hints at this. It is likely that this complementarity already existed in the
early eighteenth century, and even before, but further research in older records would be needed
to prove it.
We  also  find  some  support  for  Hypothesis  2,  pointing  to  the  growing  role  of  non-
embedded, repeated interactions, and on the professionalization of agents. Changes to that effect
appear in our variables related to the phrasing of contracts and to the frequent choice of some
proxies. If our results, that generally show little change, support one over-arching modernization
narrative,  it  would  be  that  of  professionalization,  rather  than  depersonalization.  Supporting
Hypothesis 2, the study of blank forms and substitution clauses has also pointed out the limits of
one common hidden assumption: the idea that what mattered to the commercial relationship,
52 Studying long-term notarial credit, Hoffman et al., Priceless markets, p. 286, concluded: “If one believes that 
capitalism involves large-scale credit in a depersonalized market, then capitalism has to have arisen long before the 
nineteenth century.” See also Santarosa, 'Financing,' for how the joint liability rule promoted a semi-anonymous 
market for bills of exchange in long-distance trade. 
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what was to be described, what possibly supported trust, was the type of pre-existing tie between
two individuals. On the contrary, blank forms and substitution clauses are indications of longer
relational  chains,  in  which  the  principal-proxy  contract  is  just  one  step,  in  the  case  of
substitutions, or could only be established thanks to one or several intermediaries,  especially
notaries, in the case of blank forms. 
Our findings open several avenues for future research. Time-series data could allow us to
disentangle the preference for a fellow merchant from the preference for someone who knows
how to recover debts and offer additional support to Hypothesis 3, which considers the social
status of “merchant” as a broad base for homophily, signaling not just commercial skills but a
shared  identity.  Finding  traces  of  reciprocation  and  mutual  agency  in  the  principal-proxy
relationships among merchants, phenomena which are likely to unfold over more than one year,
would point more clearly in the first direction. Finally, extending our sample across time may
shed light on the extent to which powers of attorney were part  of the “usual business” of a
merchant, as opposed to an instrument reserved to react to exceptional situations. Understanding
when a power of attorney represented a one-time interaction or short-term agency leading to a
long-term partnership will elucidate the place of powers of attorney in the commercial life of
merchants and the tradeoffs of these instruments in view of the menu of contractual devices
available to merchants. 
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Appendix 1: Details of our sampling scheme
Table A: Number of observations per city and year
City\Year 1751 1800 1851 Total
Lille 40 42 100 182
Lyons 75 140 61 276
Marseilles 119 73 82 274
Paris 43 43 61 147
Total 277 298 304 879
Sources: 
Lille:  Archives  départementales  du  Nord.  For  1751:  series  2E3,  boxes  127  (Becquart),  498  (Cornil
Caullet), 618, 693, 713, 897 (Courtecuisse), 1520 (Desrousseaux), 4290 (diverse notaries), 2124 (Duriez),
2928 (Legrand),  3130 (Lesage),  3233 (Marissal),  3498 (Nicole),  3698 (Ployart),  4047 (Vanoye).  For
1800:  J1318/3  (Salembier),  J1472/20-21  (Coustenoble),  J1464/2  (Demilly),  J327/17  (Desrousseaux),
2861/135  (Leroy),  J953/49-50  (Watrelos).  For  1851:  12E48/172-174  (Lebigre,  1851),  2E83/34-36
(Gruloy, 1851), 2E86/39 (Saint-Léger, 1851)
Lyons: Archives départementales du Rhône, series 3E. For 1751: boxes 9688 (Fromental), 4698 (Durand),
6913 (Patrin),  7895 (Saulnier).  For  1800:  22990 (Coste),  9197 (Caillat),  9744 (Fromental),  12868-9
(Voron). For 1851: 13524-5 (Charvériat), 23122-4 (Coste), 24074 (Laval).
Marseilles: Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône.  For 1751: 353E/155 (Bègue),  364E/458
(Chéry), 362E/189 (Coste). For 1800: 362E/245 (Pin), 364E/535 (Portelany), 370E/84 (Reynaud). For
1851: 354E/319 (Delanglade), 364E/640 (Giraud), 390E/474-477 (Raynouard). 
Paris:  Archives  Nationales.  For  1751:  MC/ET/X/495-498  (Macquer),  MC/ET/XLVIII/97-102  (Patu),
MC/ET/LXXVI/329-332  (Mouette).  For  1800:  MC/ET/X/838-840  (Gobin),  MC/ET/XLVIII/428-433
(Robin),  MC/ET/LXXVI/554-557  (Chiboust).  For  1851:  MC/ET/X/1216-1220  (Aumont-Thiéville),
MC/ET/XLVIII/789-793 (Dufour), MC/ET/LXXVI/811-817 (Frémyn).
For  this  paper,  we  randomly  sampled  proxy forms  out  of,  whenever  possible,  three
notaries for each city and year (four when each notary's records did not include enough proxy
forms). We are in the process of collecting a reduced number of variables, those that appeared the
most interesting in the present research, for a total of ca. 3,000 forms, i.e. all the proxy forms
recorded by our notaries. As Table A shows, our sample is biased toward some cities and dates:
numbers are neither equal for each date and year, nor proportional to the population or total
number of notarized contracts. We have tried weighing the sample so as to correct for this bias in
the  few  tables  that  consider  all  the  cities  together.  This  does  not  change  the  direction  or
significance of our results.
We chose three notaries in each city, except for Lille in 1751 and 1800, where there were
few surviving notarial records and even fewer proxy forms, so that we sampled from all the
surviving records. Using all  the notarial  records for Lille in 1851, we were able to code the
professions of all principals and proxies, so as to identify the three notaries who had the greatest
number of merchants among their clients. 
For  Lyons,  we  used  the  notaries'  addresses  to  select  those  who  were  located  in  the
commercial center of the city, roughly between place Perrache and place des Terreaux. Then we
used a combination of practical criteria (e.g. we excluded the notaries who had too few records)
31
and browsing through records to cursorily identify notaries who had a lot of merchant clients
involved as principals or proxies.
For Marseilles in 1800, we were able to use tax records53 in order to find which notaries
produced a lot of protests on bills of exchange, on the assumption that those were the merchants'
notaries. We focused the data collection on them. For 1751 and 1851, we tried to collect data
among their predecessors' and successors' records and, when this did not produce a lot of proxy
forms involving merchants, we used addresses to locate better candidates. 
For Paris, we used the 1751 and 1851 ARNO databases to choose two notarial offices
(étude  76  and  étude  10)  in  which  proxy  forms  were  plentiful,  seemed  to  include  more
commercial and financial tasks than average (debt recovery, dealing with annuities, managing
companies), and to have had more merchants as protagonists than average (although information
on this point was sketchy, especially for 1751). In addition, we included  étude 48, which was
singled out by a previous study as the notary of the commercial-financial neighborhood around
the Stock Exchange.54
Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics (N=879)
Variable / category %
Type of form
Proxy form written by the notary in Paris, Marseilles, Lyon or Lille 78
“Deposit:” proxy form written by a different notary elsewhere 15
Other (substitution, discharge, etc.) 7
Forms not written in any of our four cities
Written somewhere else in France 10
Written in a foreign country 4
Length of form
Less than one page 28
One to two pages 60
More than two pages 12
Phrase “procuration générale et spéciale” (covering auxiliary tasks) 66
Includes restrictions to discretion for at least one task 6
No final clause 16
Among final clauses: as the principal would have done in person 22
Among final clauses: do whatever will be necessary 16
Includes substitution clause of any type 57
More than one principal 17
The proxy appears at least four times in our sample 8
Blank forms
Completely blank form 27
Originally blank form that has been filled in with the name of a proxy 7
Non-blank form 66
53 Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône, 12 Q9 2 /49-52.
54 Hoffman et al. Priceless markets.
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Profession/Social Status of the principal(s)*
unknown 26
merchant 25
other eco 15
propertied 14
civil servant 9
other 6
lawyer 3
employee of merchant 2
financial 1
Profession/Social Status of the proxy*
blank 26
non-blank, but profession unknown 20
merchant 13
lawyer 12
financial 9
other eco 8
propertied 5
other 3
employee of merchant 3
civil servant 2
Combination of professions/status of the principal(s) and proxy (1)*
merchant to blank 9
merchant to merchant 5
merchant to other 10
other to blank 17
other to merchant 7
other to other 51
Combination of positions of the principal(s) and proxy (2)*
ECO to blank 14
ECO to ECO 15
ECO to other 14
other to blank 12
other to ECO 17
other to other 29
merchant: called marchand or négociant or commissionnaire in the source (denotes wholesale activity and
social respectability); financial: bankers and brokers; employee of merchant: those employed in shops or
by merchants;  other eco:  manufacturers,  workers,  shopkeepers,  master  artisans,  captains of ships,  etc.;
lawyers:  attorneys,  notaries,  their  clerks,  judges,  bailiffs,  etc.;  civil  servants:  in  the  military  or  the
bureaucracy; propertied: denotes the French propriétaires and rentiers, those who live from the income of
their lands or annuities. ECO: includes merchant, financial, employee of merchant, and eco.
Combination of genders of principal(s) and proxy
Man to man 46
Man to blank 18
Woman to man 14
Man and woman to man 7
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Woman to blank 5
Man to woman 5
Man and woman to blank 3
Woman to woman 1
Explicit relationship between principal(s) and proxy
None 80
Other kin 11
Spouse 5
Other (neighbors, employer-ee, co-heirs, members of a partnership, etc.) 3
City where the proxy form was originally recorded in
The city where the principal lives 29
The city where the proxy lives 16
The city where both live 50
A city where neither the principal, nor the proxy seem to live 4
Main task to be performed by the proxy (exclusive from each other)**
Recovering debts 27
Dealing with inheritance 16
Selling annuities or collecting interest 14
Managing land and/or buildings 9
Selling land and/or buildings 9
Other non-commercial matters*** 6
Other commercial matters**** 5
Representation in court 4
Managing a company 3
Selling something else (mostly merchandise) 3
Doing everything for the principal 3
** The proxy form often lists auxiliary tasks the proxy can undertake to accomplish the main task. For instance, the
delegation of authority to manage a company may include debt recovery, selling of merchandise, representation in
court, etc. Such auxiliary tasks are dealt with in the variable below.
*** For example accepting a donation, representation in family proceedings, e.g. about the care of orphans.
**** For example representation in bankruptcy proceedings, checking the delivery of merchandise
Tasks mentioned in the proxy form (each proxy form can include more than one of these tasks)
Representation in court 45
Recovering debts or receiving sums generally 34
Recovering specific debts or receiving specific sums 27
Selling land and/or buildings 18
Dealing with one specific inheritance 17
Settling accounts: all the accounts related to the main task 14
Paying: all the sums related to the main task 14
Selling annuities 9
Selling merchandise or other items 8
Receiving interest from annuities 7
Managing land and/or buildings: all the properties of the principal 6
Managing land and/or buildings: specific land(s) or building(s) 6
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Dealing with a bankruptcy (as creditor) 6
Other non-commercial matter (e.g. related to mortgage) 6
Paying: specific sums to specific persons 4
Buying something (land, merchandise, etc.) 4
Managing a company 4
Settling accounts: with one or several specific persons 3
Other commercial action (e.g. related to patents, lending money) 3
Petitioning the authorities 3
Other family business (dealing with curatorship, etc.) 2
Borrowing 2
Dealing with a winding up of business 1
Dealing with any inheritance proceeding for the principal 1
35
